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ABSTRACT. Adaptation to climate change can be an inclusive and collective, rather than an individual effort. The choice for collective
arrangements is tied to a call for solidarity. We distinguish between one-sided (assisting community members in need) and two-sided
solidarity (furthering a common interest) and between voluntary and compulsory solidarity. We assess the strength of solidarity as a
basis for adaptation measures in six Dutch water management case studies. Traditionally, Dutch water management is characterized
by compulsory two-sided solidarity at the water board level. Since the French times, the state is involved through compulsory national
solidarity contributions to avoid societal disruption by major floods. In so far as this furthers a common interest, the contributions
qualify as two-sided solidarity, but if  it is considered assistance to flood-prone areas, they also qualify as one-sided solidarity. Although
the Delta Programme explicitly continues on this path, our case studies show that solidarity continues to play an important role in
Dutch water management in the process of adapting to a changing climate, but that an undifferentiated call for solidarity will likely
result in debates over who should pay what and why. Such discussions can lead to cancellation or postponement of adaptation measures,
which are not considered to be in the common interest or result in an increased reliance on local solidarity.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change will not affect all parts of society equally. Some
areas are more vulnerable and some groups will suffer more
strongly from climate change than others. Coastal areas, areas
below sea level, and flood plains are more vulnerable to flood
risks, and education, income, gender, age, and source of livelihood
strongly influence people’s vulnerability and adaptive capacity (cf.
Adger 2003). Different normative values and cultural traditions
give rise to different governance arrangements to cope with these
risks. This means that there is not one single approach to decide
what constitutes effective adaptation (Termeer et al. 2011,
Keessen et al. 2013). Similarly, various approaches exist to bear
or share the burden of adaptation (Farber 2007).  
Sometimes adaptation can be carried out more effectively and
efficiently through collective efforts than individually. This
contradicts the idea that adaptation should be left to individuals
because the gains are for those who adapt (McNall 2011).
However, building or reinforcing dikes around densely populated
areas to protect them from flooding is both cheaper and more
inclusive than taking individual flood-protection measures,
provided that there is a strong governance arrangement to
implement it. In water management, man-made borders can make
collaboration and collective systems rather difficult. This is
particularly visible in transboundary water management, in which
state sovereignty, national interests, upstream-downstream
complexities, and discrepancies between policy arrangements on
both sides of the border continue to hinder a more collective
approach to transboundary water management (Van Eerd et al.
2015a).  
Adaptation as an inclusive and collective effort, rather than an
individual one, is related to the principle of solidarity. In essence,
the principle of solidarity means that one acts to support members
of a particular community to which one believes to belong
(Bayertz 1999). This principle was already present in a family
context in Roman times. Over time it has acquired meaning
beyond family ties in support of larger communities or even
society as a whole (Komter 2005). Solidarity can also become
compulsory. The best-known example is the welfare state, in which
solidarity serves to legitimize the redistribution of financial
resources by the state. Other examples are in the fields of
education and healthcare, in countries in which these services have
not been privatized.  
This contribution investigates the role that solidarity plays in
strategies for adaptation in a broad range of issues in the interplay
of climate and water in the Netherlands. In many countries, the
prospect of climate change has led to government plans for
adaptation measures (Biesbroek et al. 2010, Berrang-Ford et al.
2011) and to changes in governance arrangements (Gasper et al.
2011, Van Buuren et al. 2014, Mees 2016). The extent to which
societies expect the state to coordinate these plans and concerted
action to implement them differs across countries, and it appears
to be subject to change as a result of a changing climate (Adger
et al. 2013, Vink et al. 2014). We address the policy debates that
shape the inclusiveness of climate adaptation strategies in
traditional collective governance arrangements for Dutch water
management, focussing on the function and meaning of
solidarity. We aim to answer the following research questions: are
there any signs that the proposed measures to adapt to climate
change put pressure on existing governance arrangements, and
what does this mean for the role of solidarity in the various
arrangements? To put it more dramatically: is solidarity-based
water management still tenable in times of climate change?  
We will answer these questions on the basis of a series of water
management cases in the Netherlands. We have selected this
country for three reasons. First, the Netherlands is vulnerable to
climate change. According to the 2014 report by the Royal
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Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI 2014), Dutch
winters will be less cold and wetter, whereas summers will be
warmer and either drier or wetter. Extreme weather, such as hail,
storms, and heat waves are expected to occur more frequently.
Coupled with sea-level rise and land subsidence, this means that
flood risks will increase from the North Sea, the large rivers, and
from precipitation. Vulnerability further increases because of the
continuous development of housing and business areas in low-
lying regions. Second, the Netherlands has a strong adaptive
capacity in view of its long tradition in water management (Van
Koningsveld et al. 2008), its high GDP, its abundant freshwater
resources, and a relatively well-defined strategy to respond to
climate-change challenges. Third, solidarity was explicitly
mentioned as a policy principle in the 2008 Delta Committee
report, which set the Dutch adaptation agenda, and its successor
the Delta Programme (Vink et al. 2013, Warner et al. 2015). The
2008 Delta report states:  
Water safety is of importance for the whole of the
Netherlands: a catastrophic dike breach would have
disruptive consequences for the entire country. Water
safety is a collective, national responsibility. This was
historically the case and will always stay this way. This
is a government guarantee. Based on this collective
responsibility we apply the principle of solidarity: all
inhabitants, no matter where they live, have an interest
in water safety and will contribute financially (...). 
(Delta Commissie 2008:41; our translation from Dutch).  
The Delta Committee thus underlined that climate-change
adaptation is a collective effort, and solidarity is given explicit
emphasis. We will discuss the issue of (national) solidarity in the
light of developments on different levels of governance: the
supranational, the subnational, and the local level.
CONCEPTUALIZING SOLIDARITY
There is a lack of agreement as to the meaning of solidarity.
Having its roots in Roman law, the term is widely used, but difficult
to define (Bayertz 1999, Derpmann 2009). It refers to the
unlimited liability of each individual member in a family or other
community to pay common debts (Bayertz 1999). In essence,
solidarity has remained the same since Roman times. A defining
characteristic of a solidaristic act is that there is no equivalence
between what one contributes to others or the group as a whole
and what one gets in return (De Beer and Koster 2009). And as
the strongest shoulders bear the heaviest burdens, solidarity
reduces the gap between the fortunate and the unfortunate (De
Beer and Koster 2009).  
According to Bayertz (1999), solidarity consists of three key
elements. First of all, solidarity takes place within a community.
One does not show solidarity with everyone else, but only with
the other members of the community to which one believes one’
self  to belong. The second element is that it is felt as an obligation
to assist, which is morally commendable but not binding. The
third element is that solidary action serves to promote a common
good or interest. There is latent reciprocity in solidary
relationships. However, solidarity can manifest itself  in various
forms. To capture these distinctions, we propose a simple two-by-
two matrix (Table 1) to operationalize solidarity.








Legal obligation to pay







obligation to further a
common interest
Legal obligation to pay
taxes to fund state
measures to further a
common interest
First, we distinguish solidarity to assist community members in
need, so-called one-sided solidarity, and solidarity to promote a
common interest, so-called two-sided solidarity (De Beer and
Koster 2009). In the case of one-sided solidarity, the assistance is
given to a community member without expecting anything in
return. An example is the practice of giving alms to beggars. By
contrast, two-sided solidarity operates in two directions. It is
strongly based on mutual interdependence, limited information
on individual risks, and the expectation that one’s contribution is
balanced by an equivalent (future) contribution by someone else.
One expects on balance to benefit just as much from others as
they themselves are contributing (De Beer and Koster 2009). A
good example is fire and theft insurance, through which people
cover themselves against the hardship of these calamities by
pooling their risks. It is important to note here that in practice,
the distinction between one-sided and two-sided solidarity is often
unclear (De Beer and Koster 2009) and a solidaristic act can
therefore be a hybrid construction of one-sided and two-sided
solidarity.  
Second, in line with De Beer and Koster (2009) and Bayertz
(1999), we distinguish between voluntary and compulsory
solidarity because voluntary solidarity is organized through
private initiatives, whereas compulsory solidarity depends on
state intervention. It is not just the contrast between the private
and public domain that makes compulsory solidarity different
from voluntary solidarity. The compulsory character also changes
the nature of the “gift,” because the assistance becomes an
enforceable right for those who are entitled to it on the basis of
formal criteria. This perspective eventually reduces the reciprocal
nature of solidarity (Bayerz 1999). Compulsory systems of
solidarity can therefore evolve from two-sided to one-sided
(entitlements), although a moral appeal justified its original
establishment (Steinvorth 1999).  
Solidarity is not a given but can induce discussions regarding
belonging to the group and who should get what and why. Such
discussions are as old as the original context of solidarity: the
family. Brothers and sisters do not share everything because they
want to (voluntary solidarity), but because their parents expect
them to share (moral obligation). And siblings often fuss about
the fairness of the criteria for the distribution of material goods
(Munoz-Dardé 1999). Making an act of solidarity a compulsory
one does not make it immune to such discussions. It is also
important to realize that people’s attitudes may differ. Some are
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cosmopolitans, who consider everyone to be part of their
community (Derpmann 2009), others are selectivists, whose
solidarity is conditional, and such attitudes may change over time
(Van Oorschot 2000).  
An important condition for the willingness to offer one-sided
solidarity is the locus of individual or group responsibility, which
refers to the extent to which problems are beyond the control of
those in need. The weaker the control, the less strongly people
can be held responsible, and the more support they are considered
to deserve (Cook 1979, De Swaan 1988, Van Oorschot 2000).
Other factors affecting one-sided solidarity are the identity or
proximity of those needing support, perceived abuse and free-
rider behavior (Van Oorschot 2000), and a demand for freedom
of choice (De Beer and Koster 2009). Two-sided solidarity can be
affected by a lack of community spirit, perceived abuse, and free-
rider behavior as well. If  benefits are seen to help some groups
more than other groups, which can be identified beforehand, two-
sided solidarity becomes one-sided solidarity (De Beer and Koster
2009). The above characteristics are important in the study of
changes regarding the principle of solidarity in the face of climate
change. Is the current system of water management, which is
based on solidarity, still widely accepted? What about
discrepancies between regional or local costs and benefits on the
one hand, and national costs and benefits on the other hand?
METHODS
To gain in-depth understanding of the role of solidarity in Dutch
water management under adaptation stress, we decided on a
nested case-study approach, selecting six subcases with a
maximum variety of water management issues (Flyvbjerg 2006),
geographically spread over the Netherlands (see Fig. 1). Our
encompassing case is Dutch water management in view of a
changing climate, and its recent manifestation in the national
Delta Programme. The six subcases deal with flood risks and
freshwater supply at the international, regional, and local level.
We believe that this broad view offers a comprehensive approach
to climate-change effects, although we are fully aware that this
article only covers the issue of water management.  
The cases are based on a four-year research program on
knowledge for climate. One of the core work packages of this
program was named “normative principles” and analyzed the role
of certain governance-based, environmental, and legal principles
in Dutch climate adaptation. The individual cases were part of
dissertation projects and the information was collected and
discussed by the team of researchers in several workshops on
solidarity. To determine the role of solidarity, we will describe the
proposed or actual measure and analyze the decision-making
process, for each case, to uncover to what extent solidarity was
discussed.  
Because the people involved in the case studies did not necessarily
explicitly talk about solidarity, the process labels were interpreted
by different researchers to determine whether and to what extent
these people’s experience fits our definition of one-sided or two-
sided solidarity and to what extent solidarity appears to be under
pressure. Our research material consisted of three main sources.
First, we conducted semistructured interviews with experts, policy
makers, and stakeholders. Then, we analyzed policy documents,
studies, memos, and minutes. Third, we performed (participant)
observations of project meetings. Comprehensive methodological
justifications can be found in the respective research publications
on the case studies (Mees et al. 2014, Boezeman 2015, Keessen
and Ernst 2015, Van Eerd et al. 2015a, Vink 2015).
Fig. 1. The location of the six adaptation strategies.
RESULTS
Solidarity and adaptation at the national level
The origins of the two-sided nature of solidarity in Dutch water
management are more than 1000 years old. Because the first
inhabitants of flood-prone areas lived on self-made mounts, in
the early Middle Ages, water management was already a collective
task. Communities established water boards to create polders and
build and maintain dikes. During the French rule of the
Netherlands (1795-1813), water management was partly
centralized and became a public responsibility. This resulted in
the approximately 2000 water boards being transformed into
government authorities and in the establishment of a national
water agency to manage the main rivers (Prak and Zanden 2013,
Warner et al. 2015). The introduction of a national water agency
made it possible to promote interests beyond the water-board level
within the larger community of the Netherlands, thus creating a
system of national compulsory solidarity.  
The traditional governance structure of the water boards is based
on the trio “stake, say, pay.” The compulsory two-sided solidarity
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origins are still reflected in the water-management taxes. The
water boards’ work is funded by water taxes on the basis of the
economic value of all properties in their area. The increase in the
responsibilities of water boards resulted in mergers, now leaving
only 23 water boards, and also resulted in stronger risks of
conflicts regarding what the common interest requires be done.
Moreover, tax reforms resulted in households paying a
disproportionately large contribution to water management
compared to agriculture and industry (Dekker and Havekes
2013). Agriculture and industry therefore benefit from the one-
sided solidarity from households under the current taxation
regime.  
Fear regarding the impact of climate change has led to changes
in water management. In response to scientific alarm, the Dutch
Senate passed a resolution in 2005 to establish a political advisory
committee tasked to review Dutch flood safety, in view of the
country’s increased population, wealth, and the changing climate.
This Delta Committee drafted an advisory report based on rather
extreme climate scenarios, pointing out an urgent need to make
the Netherlands climate proof (Delta Commissie 2008). By
emphasizing the exogenous nature of climate change, which was
claimed to threaten the nation’s prosperity as a whole, the framing
of the advisory report had a national scope (Boezeman et al. 2013,
Vink et al. 2013).  
Correspondingly, solutions were sought in institutional reform
toward further centralization and large infrastructural
investments to be paid with taxpayers’ money based on solidarity
(Vink et al. 2013). Although expensive, and constitutionally at
odds with the Dutch corporatist tradition of decision making,
the proposed reforms were accepted by government and
parliament without substantial opposition (Vink et al. 2015). In
2010, the Dutch government responded to the committee’s
recommendation by establishing the Delta Programme, the Delta
Commissioner, and the Delta Fund, which are all legally rooted
in the new Delta Law (incorporated in the Water Act 2009;
NMTPWWM 2010) and operate under the Minister of
Infrastructure and Environment.  
Interestingly, the Delta Programme is explicitly based on
solidarity in the context of flood safety because solidarity
contributions from the Delta Fund are justified by fear of societal
disruption in case of a flood event (Delta Programme 2013, 2014).
Disruption on a national scale, in case of an event, appears to be
the main justification for generous solidary contributions from
the state to a region (Delta Commissie 2008). The criterion of
disruption on a national scale implies that there is a common
interest, promoted by two-sided solidarity. However, it is obvious
that solidary contributions for flood safety will be concentrated
in regions with flood-prone areas. For higher areas, this therefore
constitutes a compulsory one-sided solidarity.  
One-sided solidarity in flood-risk management is also present at
the water-board level. When the state and the water boards agreed
in 2011 that the state would reduce its contribution to 50% for
measures to improve primary flood defences, the water boards
filled the gap. They pay 40% through a solidary contribution by
all Water Boards, which leaves 10% as an individual contribution
of the water board concerned (Helpdesk Water 2011). Their
voluntary solidarity was rendered compulsory by codification in
the Water Act 2009 (Article 7.24). The water boards thus
counteracted the step toward stronger reliance on compulsory
two-sided solidarity. Their solidarity has a mixed character. It is
two-sided for the water boards with flood-prone areas, but one-
sided for water boards without any flood-prone areas. It therefore
reinforced the compulsory one-sided solidarity element in flood
safety. The policy debates in the case studies illustrate the role
solidarity plays at various levels and in different circumstances.
Six examples of solidarity at the international, regional, and
local levels
The international level
The Rhine basin: solidarity or no harm
The Rhine basin is a community of riparian countries that
cooperate on a multilateral basis in the International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR). Voluntary, two-sided
solidarity could be regarded as the principle triggering
collaboration in the Rhine basin. A good example is the Rhine
Action Plan on Floods (ICPR 1998) in which all riparian countries
cooperated to decrease the flood risks within the entire basin.
Indeed, international collaboration in the Rhine catchment is
often identified by scholars as one of the most successful examples
of cross-border cooperation (e.g., Bernauer and Moser 1996).
Managing flood risks remains one of the main challenges for the
Rhine basin (Kabat and Van Schaik 2003, Te Linde 2011).  
Interestingly, the European Floods Directive 2007/60 EC
(hereafter, FD) explicitly mentions solidarity twice. According to
the FD, solidarity means that (1) member states should not take
any measures that increase flood risks in other states, unless these
actions are coordinated, and that (2) members should seek fair
sharing of responsibilities (European Parliament and Council
2007). The directive does not contain any provisions on
international assistance (Van Eerd et al. 2015a, b). Interestingly,
all actors in the Rhine basin interpret the solidarity principle
differently. For example, Germany took the position that
measures should be in the interest of all actors affected in the
basin, also considering positive effects. By contrast, the
Netherlands invokes solidarity to remind upstream countries that
they should not pass flood risks to downstream countries (Van
Eerd et al. 2015a).  
International solidarity under the FD can be shaped and regarded
as two-sided solidarity. The Dutch delegation explicitly referred
to solidarity to overcome collaboration difficulties in the ICPR
(Van Eerd et al. 2015a). The institutionalization of solidarity in
the FD thus helped raise the awareness in the basin of the need
for solidarity. Nevertheless, it is just one aspect within the
complexity of transboundary flood risk management in which
factors, such as state sovereignty, national self-interests, and
upstream-downstream complexities, continue to hamper taking
a collective approach (Van Eerd et al. 2015a). An intriguing
example in this regard is that member states’ climate adaptation
plans continue to focus on their national situation. The successive
Dutch Delta Programmes (key aspect of Dutch adaptation
policies) have maintained their purely national focus. They do not
consider possibilities for cross-border cooperation or identify any
impacts of the program for upstream regions. This means that
international cooperation is only slowly progressing from
avoiding harm, i.e., flood risks, toward taking two-sided solidary
action to decrease flood risks in the basin as a whole.
Ecology and Society 21(4): 35
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art35/
The regional level
Solidarity in northeast Netherlands
In 1998, northeast Netherlands was shocked by unexpectedly
serious floods. Evacuations and intentional inundations
prompted the water boards of Aa en Hunze and Noorderzijlvest,
and the provinces of Groningen and Drenthe to jointly initiate
risk-management projects to strengthen water safety in the region.
The catchment areas receive drainage water from the polders and
discharge it into the Wadden Sea, Ems, or Dollard. Because of
climatic changes, it is believed that this process will become
increasingly difficult. The KNMI (2014) climate scenarios
projected an increase in winter precipitation by 3% to 17% and a
sea-level rise of between 15 and 40 cm in 2050, because soil,
currently already below sea level, is subsiding. The region is
particularly vulnerable because of storms and substantial
precipitation, making water discharge (temporarily) impossible
(Van den Hurk et al. 2015). After the 1998 events, the provinces
set an equal safety norm of 1 flood in 100 years for the area, but
the Dry Feet 2050 (2011-2014) project proposed to set new flood
norms and policies in the face of provincial ambitions to increase
flood safety, in view of climatic change and ongoing soil
subsidence due to gas mining (Boezeman et al. 2014).  
Two important issues regarding solidarity emerged during the
norm-setting process. The first relates to the differentiation in
safety levels because of a new norm-setting method. Each polder
is categorized based on the calculated economic damage in case
of an inundation. The aggregated potential damage determines
the safety level in the polder. Grasslands may flood once every 10
years, urban or high-level industrial areas once every 300 or 1000
years. Previously, the differences were not that large because the
province had set a minimum safety level for each member of the
community. Nevertheless, the province and water board now
differentiate protection levels among the polders, despite the
undifferentiated water management taxes. This approach results
in the accrual of benefits among the polders with the highest
amount of vulnerable assets, which is justified by the argument
that granting a higher, yet for every inhabitant equal, safety level
would be very costly: an “equal-rights approach is not possible
because it would be financially unaffordable” (interview,
Groningen 7 March 2013). Thus, solidarity remained compulsory,
but lost part of its two-sided character. The discussion on the
fairness of sharing equal costs while obtaining unequal benefits
is expected to return in the aftermath of a flood event.  
Second, a discussion emerged on who should finance measures
to prevent inundation of installations of the national gas company
(Dry Feet 2050 project meeting, May 2014). Because inundation
damage to such installations may result in the gas supply to a
region as big as northwestern Europe being cut off, these locations
were awarded the highest levels of protection. A discussion ensued
about whether it would be fair if  the local community, i.e., the
inhabitants of the entire catchment area, were to pay for the extra
protection of the gas location, while the state, and hence the Dutch
community as a whole, reaps the annual benefits of several billions
of Euros; a sensitive issue in the region. On top of this, the national
gas company had constructed a new nitrogen plant in the flood-
prone Tussenklappen polder, effectively increasing potential
damage. The advice of the water board had been overruled by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs on the grounds that this was in the
national interest. In this case, it did not (yet) happen, but the Delta
Programme includes examples of voluntary private payments,
which are used to increase the quality of flood-defence measures
(Delta Programme 2014). Further discussion is expected to
develop on the question of whether economically valuable or
industrial locations must pay more for additional safety measures
instead of relying on (one-sided) solidarity.
A solidarity failure in the Lake IJssel region
Lake IJssel is the largest freshwater lake in the Netherlands. The
Delta (sub)program DPIJ developed strategies to raise the lake’s
water level by 1.5 metres to increase water storage for dry periods,
especially for agricultural and water management purposes in the
west of the country, and also to fight against salt water intrusion
from a rising sea. However, rising water levels would potentially
inundate harbor areas and nature reserves and threaten touristic
waterfronts around the lake. Because the Lake IJssel region would
bear the costs without having any benefits from the plans, it was
not surprising that the plans sparked opposition among the
regional and local governments and stakeholders in this area.
(Delta Programme 2011, Vink et al. 2015).  
The DPIJ attempted to accommodate the initial opposition by
initiating a semiopen, ad hoc consultative governance approach
parallel to the different layers of constitutional decision making.
Around 300 regional and local political decision makers,
administrators, experts, and stakeholders were regularly invited
to share ideas and formulate broad-based strategies for raising
the lake’s water level. The approach initially yielded enthusiasm
among participants, which gradually faded. The DPIJ framed the
national freshwater goal as a technical problem, implying
knowledge and management as the fundamental problem, and
expertise and efficiency as the solution. Formulations like
“working on a water task” and “updating an outdated water
management system” downplayed initial opposition.  
The Delta Committee emphasized fundamental questions
regarding the allocation of costs and benefits and solidarity,
whereas the DPIJ either incorporated these questions in general
technical frames, implying efficiency solutions, or avoided them
by referring to other fora as more appropriate for debating
solidarity issues. The technical framings avoided political conflict,
but led to apathy among political decision makers. Accordingly,
deliberations remained apolitical (Vink et al. 2013). By translating
the attempt to achieve voluntary one-sided solidarity into a
technical cost-benefit analysis, the issue was finally settled without
political negotiation between regional and national political
decision makers (Bos and Zwaneveld 2012). The analysis resulted
in the 1.5-metre plan being postponed for not being cost effective.
It seems that the controversial solidarity dimension of the issue
was sidestepped here.
High Sandy Soils (DHZ): two-sided solidarity or one-sided
solidarity
In the higher areas of the Netherlands, water-scarcity measures
are necessary to adapt to climate change. Because drought was
not immediately seen to meet the national disruption criterion for
national solidarity through the Delta Fund, various actors
decided to start their own initiatives. Water boards, the provinces
of Brabant and Limburg, nature organizations, agricultural
organizations, and drinking-water companies started the Delta
Plan High Sandy Soils (DHZ) as a regional climate adaptation
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initiative. Since 2012, DHZ has been cooperating with the
similarly organized collaborative program Fresh-Water Supply
East Netherlands (ZON). Together they refer to their entire region
as the high Netherlands (see Fig. 1), signalling the difference with
lower areas where flood protection is a main issue in climate
adaptation.  
The regional DHZ ran in parallel with, and partly as a reaction
to, the national Delta Programme, which has a national
subprogram on freshwater supply. Over the years, a closer
relationship with and participation in the Delta Programme has
developed to gain support at the national level for the issues of
the high sandy grounds. The actors participating in DHZ and
ZON made a regional offer to the Delta Programme on freshwater
in 2014. In addition to a regional program of measures, this offer
involved a claim for a financial contribution from the national
Delta Fund for implementation. The actors involved would
contribute funds as well.  
In the case of DHZ, the principle of solidarity can be identified
in the discussions that arose regarding the agenda setting of the
Delta Programme and the distribution of finances and resources
from the national Delta Fund. The DHZ program requires a
financial contribution from the national Delta Fund to address
issues of drought and freshwater supply in the southeast region
of the Netherlands. This is currently a claim for voluntary one-
sided solidarity of the Netherlands as a whole toward these
regions. If  the proposal of the Delta subprogram on freshwater
supply to establish minimum levels of freshwater supply were
adopted, this could imply the creation of a right and perhaps lead
to more contributions from the state or the Delta Fund. The DHZ
argues that a fair share for drought measures in higher regions
should be discussed, because the share of funds going to flood
protection is very large and mainly benefits the western flood-
prone regions, meaning that it is not two-sided but compulsory
and one-sided from the perspective of the higher regions.
Therefore they argue in favor of one-sided solidarity
contributions for their drought management measures.
The local level
Tholen: two-sided solidarity at the local level
Tholen is a former island in the province of Zeeland, surrounded
by Lake Volkerak-Zoom, the Oosterschelde estuary, and the
Scheldt Rhine canal. The land is mainly used for agriculture (De
Vries et al. 2009), but the supply of freshwater via precipitation
and groundwater is insufficient to meet the current and
anticipated agricultural demands. After the implementation of
the Delta Works, the groundwater chloride levels at Tholen
decreased, but remained inadequate for irrigation purposes. The
Tholen branch of the farmers’ association lobbied for decades on
behalf  of the local farmers to facilitate freshwater supply from
outside the island (Keessen and Ernst 2015). Although the initial
plan to improve freshwater supply to farmers was not carried out
because of a lack of funding, water board Zeeuwse Eilanden
decided, in 2001, to initiate a pilot project to improve irrigation
on 1000 ha (Waterschap Zeeuwse Eilanden 2009). In April 2013,
after a series of talks and negotiations, this pilot project led to a
jointly drafted proposal from the water board and the Tholen
farmers’ association. The proposed structural arrangement for
freshwater supply on Tholen included a payment scheme. Nearly
80% of the farmers supported the proposal (Waterschap
Scheldestromen 2013a).  
The water board’s special tax scheme ensures that the measure is
paid for by the users, defined as owners and right holders of tenure
of unbuilt agricultural lands on Tholen, regardless of whether
and how much water they abstract from the ditches. Taxation here
is directly related to the use of facilities owned or managed by the
water board, i.e., the local ditches, sluices, pumps, and other
facilities (Keessen and Ernst 2015). An informal advisory council,
consisting of users distributed geographically over the three tariff
zones was established in May 2013 to participate in the
management of the freshwater supply from the lake, most notably
to advise on future investments for the improvement of the local
freshwater supply (Waterschap Scheldestromen 2013b). This
adaptation measure, therefore, provides an example of the
continued relevance of collective action in water management.
After a majority of the farmers voted in favor of the proposed
arrangement, inclusion became compulsory, thus creating two-
sided compulsory solidarity. However, this arrangement is now
threatened by natural and man-made changes. Because the lake
will become brackish to improve water quality, the farmers on the
island need to find new water resources and create another new
arrangement.
Heijplaat (Rotterdam): one-sided solidarity and individual action
Climate change also brings challenges for areas that are
unembanked and in which flood safety is a private responsibility.
The municipality is an important player in this regard because
the water authorities are only responsible for the flood safety of
people who live within their dike rings and are not responsible for
unembanked areas. Hence, when the municipality of Rotterdam
wanted to transform the unembanked harbor districts in the inner
city into new innovative residential and working areas (http://
stadshavensrotterdam.nl/en/), it had to consider flood-safety
aspects as well. The usual approach is to raise the area to avoid
flooding. It is then up to the businesses and citizens to arrange
for their own flood protection and cover their own damages, but
in urban areas many inhabitants are unaware of these flood risks
(De Boer et al. 2012). In addition, they lack a sense of urgency.
Citizens are more concerned with the level of social services
(school, supermarket, etc.) of their neighborhood (Mees et al.
2014).  
Nevertheless, the decision-making process was quite collaborative
and involved all the relevant public and private stakeholders. It
resulted in a public-private partnership, a contract signed by all
partners including a residents’ representative, although
Rotterdam’s mayor and aldermen formally took the key decisions
on flood-safety measures (Mees et al. 2014). As a result, part of
the early-1900s village has been demolished to allow for new
development, and part of the old village will remain as it is. The
new part of Heijplaat will be built adaptively. Flood proofing new
houses is less expensive than raising the new village and avoids
ugly ground-level differences between the old and the new part.
Under the municipal rules, the responsibility for this flood-
proofing work lies with the project developer and the future
residents (Mees et al. 2014). In addition, a partial levy is planned
and financed by the municipality to raise the protection level of
both old and new Heijplaat to a 1 in 250 years flood probability.
Nevertheless, there will be a difference in flood protection between
the old (1 in 250 years) and the new village (1 in 4000 years, which
corresponds with the parts of Rotterdam that are protected by
dikes), because of the flood proofing of the new village (Mees et
al. 2014).  
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The Heijplaat case shows a form of voluntary one-sided
solidarity: the municipality has taken the initiative to finance and
implement the partial levy for the residents of Heijplaat, with tax
money borne by all residents of Rotterdam. However, there is no
form of solidarity with regard to the constructive measures. Even
if  the project developer implements flood-proofing measures
collectively (it is more efficient to do so on a large scale during
construction), the flood-proofing measures still have an
individual character for the specific residents of the flood-proof
houses and their legal successors (Mees et al. 2014). Another
interesting point of discussion is the difference in flood protection
between the old village on the one hand, and the new village and
the rest of Rotterdam on the other hand. What will happen when
a flood causes serious damage to the houses in the old village?
Officially, they have to bear their own damage because the
national government is not obliged to compensate for damage in
unembanked areas. Actually, it will be a social housing
corporation who will suffer most of the damage. Perhaps the
municipality might have or feel a moral duty to help those in need
in case of serious damage, as an expression of voluntary one-sided
solidarity because these are Rotterdam citizens, and the
municipality allowed the development of this unembanked area
based on the then best-available data.
DISCUSSION
All case studies illustrate the important role that solidarity plays
in Dutch water management due to the historical preference for
collective arrangements. They also show that solidarity in water
management is not immune to controversies, as was also shown
in the context of the welfare state (e.g., Van Oorschot 2000, De
Beer and Koster 2009, Van Houwelinge et al. 2014). The changing
climate may also change the way solidarity issues are addressed.
The Delta Programme justifies compulsory solidarity
contributions from the Delta Fund to flood-prone regions,
referring to the threat of major flood events leading to disruption
on a national scale. Although the water boards in the higher
regions appear to agree with this criterion, they also lobby to
acquire Delta funding for water-scarcity measures, thus revealing
the importance of reciprocity in solidary relationships.  
Indeed, the approach to flood safety stands in stark contrast with
the self-supportive financial arrangement that applies to other
water tasks. Water boards can finance these tasks by raising their
own taxes, which are traditionally based on two-sided compulsory
solidarity in the water board’s territory. An explanation for the
difference between flood safety and other water tasks could be
the high costs involved in improving flood defences. This seems
unlikely however, because measures to improve water quality or
water supply can be very expensive as well. However, for the
implementation of those tasks, each water board has individual
financial responsibility. Another explanation is that one-sided
mandatory solidarity is justified because floods are a natural
phenomenon and therefore beyond the control of those affected,
but this applies to water-scarcity problems as well. The most likely
explanation is the disruptive effect of major floods, which
warrants one-sided solidary contributions in advance because
bearing the costs of the aftermath of a flood is even more
expensive.  
When national solidary contributions are contested, a possible
solution is to rely on solidarity at the regional level. However,
solidarity can be contested at this level as well. Contested
solidarity can lead to postponement and a reduction in adaptation
measures, as with the Lake IJssel area, the northeastern
Netherlands, and the High Sandy Soils have shown. A lack of
means or options for collective solidary approaches can also lead
to the reemergence of individual measures, as the Heijplaat case
shows, in which flood-prone buildings supplement the safety
provided by the levy. The example of Tholen suggests that a lack
of national solidarity can be overcome by seeking two-sided
solidarity in the region. Looking beyond the nation state for
solidarity, for instance at a river-basin level, is not an option there
because solidarity at that level is hardly beyond the stage of a duty
to avoid harm.  
Considering that the Netherlands spends billions on water
management (e.g., GNMIE 2012, Dekker and Havekes 2013), it
is surprising that it remains relatively quiet on the related financial
arrangements and their underlying principles and consequences.
This could be due to the depoliticized, expert nature of water
management. There appears to be broad consensus (or rather
broad acquiescence) regarding the advantages of the collective
and solidary character of water management. This is visible in
the Delta Programme’s policy documents and in the visionary
report of the Delta Committee. And as our case studies show,
solidarity is firmly rooted in the various adaptation measures on
the ground. However, a closer look at the various forms of
solidarity shows that solidarity cannot be taken for granted. If
expectations of reciprocity are not met, this suggests that
increased reliance on one-sided solidarity represents an
insufficient reflection of the preference for two-sided solidarity
to fund water-management measures.
CONCLUSIONS
Our research questions were whether or not there are any signs
that the measures proposed to adapt to climate change put the
existing governance system under pressure, and what this means
for the role of solidarity in various arrangements. Although not
always explicitly mentioned, our case studies confirm that
solidarity lies at the roots of both national and regional water-
management adaptation strategies (cf. Wiering et al. 2015).
However, discussions have revealed that solidarity can no longer
be taken for granted. Undifferentiated calls for solidarity may
incite discussion over who should pay how much and for what
reason. The distinction between two-sided (collectively
promoting a common interest) and one-sided (assisting those in
need) solidarity is useful in this regard. Regional actors do not
consider every adaptation measure to automatically be of
common interest. If  a measure is said to of the common interest,
regional actors rightly expect it to promote their interests as well,
instead of it being a mere request for assistance with a more one-
sided character.  
Such a selfish attitude does not signal the end of a collective
approach. On the contrary, the debate regarding the fair share of
the Delta funding for water-scarcity measures is essentially about
establishing reciprocity to maintain two-sided solidarity
relationships. Suppressing the moral side of the debate by taking
a purely technical and cost-benefit perspective, as occurred in the
Lake IJssel region, does not seem to be a good answer to a
solidarity crisis. Debate in itself  is not a threat to solidarity, but
a sign that the form of solidarity or the way it is organized needs
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to change (De Beer and Koster 2009). In a democratic society, it
should be possible to have a transparent and public debate
regarding what kind of adaptation measures are really necessary
and to what extent those in need are able to fund adaptation
measures themselves (cf. De Beer and Koster 2009). In this regard,
it is also relevant which other social goals can be advanced by
various adaptation measures (Farber 2007).  
Our case studies show that debates regarding forms of solidarity
are not a real threat to the existing governance approach, because
two-sided solidarity is still firmly embedded in the system. One-
sided solidary contributions only offer part of the required
funding for adaptation measures. Controversies sparked some
changes, although they remained under control through
pragmatic solutions: e.g., reducing the requested one-sided
contribution in the Lake IJssel area and increased lobbying for a
fair share for drought-management measures in the High Sandy
Soils case to create two-sided solidarity for adaptation measures.
Interestingly, the small-scale case studies showed two inherently
different responses to a solidarity crisis: strengthening two-sided
solidarity at the local level in Tholen and combining a one-sided
solidarity contribution with individual adaptation measures in
Rotterdam. These examples show that rejected (one-sided)
solidarity does not have to lead to postponed or reduced
adaptation measures. It can also result in a revival of historical
governance modes, when two-sided solidarity was the norm and
water management was organized on a much smaller scale,
involving citizens more directly.
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